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Abstract 
We study the market price reaction and liquidity impact that firms experience 
when they are incorporated into the differentiated corporate governance listing 
segments of the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange. The Brazilian market is of special 
interest since it allows us to analyze the effect of improved governance while 
keeping the market microstructure unchanged. The market price reaction is 
positive and significant when a firm announces its decision to commit to 
greater transparency and minority shareholder protection. We also find that 
shares with voting rights experience a stronger price reaction than non-voting 
shares. The liquidity impact of improved governance is also positive since 
trading costs decrease after incorporation into the differentiated segments. 
This liquidity enhancement is more pronounced for shares with voting rights. 
Our results imply that stock exchanges can play a critical role in leading, not 
following, the implementation of improved governance standards in countries 
with weak investor protection regulation.   
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1. Introduction and motivation 
 
Investor protection is frequently mentioned as a necessary condition for stock 
market development (La Porta et al., 1998, 2002; Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002; Levine 
and Zerbos, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Since well-functioning stock markets are 
an important source of corporate financing, it is of little surprise that the growth 
prospects of many countries become inevitably linked to improvements in transparency 
and shareholder protection, both of which are key components of current corporate 
governance
2 efforts. This paper studies the link between firm value, liquidity, and the 
commitment to improved corporate governance standards in Brazil, an important 
emerging economy. Brazil is an interesting case since it has historically provided a 
weak investor protection environment while, recently, its stock exchange has adopted 
innovative measures that allow firms to reach improved governance standards.  
 
Characterizing the relationship between owners and managers, agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976) proposes that governance mechanisms are necessary in 
order to align managers￿ (agents￿) interests with those of the firm￿s owners (principals). 
If this is not done, agents will make decisions that will many times maximize their own 
utility instead of that of the firm￿s owners (Grossman and Hart, 1986). Initially, most 
research efforts concentrated on studying issues related to management￿s expropriation 
of shareholder value. However, attention is now directed towards the expropriation of 
creditors￿ and minority shareholders￿ value by majority or controlling shareholders. The 
fact that there are economic benefits of having control can be directly observed by the 
premiums paid for voting versus non-voting shares. Several studies have documented   
the benefit of control across a wide spectrum of countries (Nenova 2000, Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997, Zingales 1994).       
 
Intuitively, one would expect firm value and increased investor protection to be 
positively correlated (Joh 2003, La Porta et. al. 2002, Yermack 1996). This occurs 
because potential providers of funds should be willing to pay higher prices for assets 
that are issued by firms that offer more protection against the expropriation of cash 
flows. Corporate scandals in the United Sates and Europe have undoubtedly played an 
important part in the observed increased demand for accounting transparency and better 
protection of stakeholder rights. However, even before the Enron scandal
3, regulatory 
agencies and stock exchanges in emerging economies had long recognized the need for 
improvement in their governance mechanisms as part of an on-going effort to promote 
the development of their capital markets. In a September 2000 interview, the President 
of the Brazilian Securities Commission, Jose Luis Osorio, stated that ￿Where minority 
rights are protected, the greater the value of stocks and therefore the cost of capital is 
                                                 
1 Taken from the article ￿¿Vale la Pena el Gobierno Corporativo?￿, by Carlos Vasconcellos, 
AmericaEconomia, August 2001. 
2 Broadly defined, corporate governance is the set of rules that govern the interaction between managers 
and stakeholders. Implied in this definition is the notion that the interaction should be based on the 
principals of fairness and transparency, since all parties wish to maximize the long-run value of the firm 
3 Enron officially admitted it was being investigated by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) in October 22, 2001 IE Working Paper                                    WP06-08                                14-02-006 
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lower, and this is our objective￿. Osorio went on to say that minority investors had been 
￿greatly disrespected￿. Investors agreed. A few months later, Mark Mobius, President of 
Templeton Emerging Markets, provided an interesting article describing what it was 
like to be minority shareholder in Brazil
4. 
 
From a market liquidity viewpoint, enhanced governance generates an 
environment characterized by transparency and fair rules of play that motivates 
stakeholders to continue providing funds since they perceive an adequate level of 
compensation for the risk they bear. Thus, enhanced corporate governance standards 
should facilitate market liquidity (Brockman and Chung, 2003). Under contrary 
conditions of abuse and lack of transparency, the risk-return trade-off is altered to less 
acceptable levels. When this occurs, minority investors are no longer willing to provide 
funds, resulting in less liquid capital markets. An illiquid market provides a weaker link 
between excess savings and corporate financing needs, and thus negatively affects 
economic development.  
 
Why then, do we observe lower investor protection in countries that need 
liquidity the most, that is, in emerging countries?  In their analysis of international joint 
ventures and corporate governance, Child and Rodrigues (2000) argue that financial risk 
for firms investing in emerging countries is greater due to institutional limitations that 
generate ￿less adequate legal regulations, as well as political risks￿. They go on to 
explain that the lack of liquid secondary markets exacerbates this risk since it impedes 
the quick disposal of assets in case of liquidation. Historically, a lack of credible 
regulatory entities and low investor protection has motivated investors to hold majority 
equity positions. In other words, ownership concentration, and thus control, actually 
became a protective mechanism against inadequate regulatory environments. This 
explains why a vast majority of corporations in emerging countries are majority 
controlled. In any case, ownership concentration has long ceased to be the remedy, and 
has now become a problem for many developing countries (La Porta et al 1998). 
 
If expropriation by controlling shareholders is a possibility, then one would 
expect to observe mechanisms that would counter this. Indeed, there is a legal 
framework that protects shareholders by theoretically giving them the right to vote in 
shareholder meetings and to elect certain number of members of the Board of Directors. 
Additionally, the unification of minority shareholders into voting blocks or the 
incorporation of foreign institutional investors as shareholders should also allow 
minority owners to reduce the probability of expropriation. In practice, however, these 
protective mechanisms do not always play their expected roles.  
 
Though voting rights in shareholder meetings should provide certain leverage 
against majority shareholders, the reality is that management, in collusion with 
controlling shareholders, can do much to prevent minority owners from exercising their 
voting rights. For example, meeting notifications requiring the physical presence of 
voters can arrive late or not at all. This is especially troublesome for foreign investors
5. 
In other cases, the firm may refuse to provide shareholder lists to minority owners in 
order to prevent a more organized collusion of shareholders. Thus, shareholder meetings 
don￿t always provide the opportunity for minority voices to be heard.   
                                                 
4 Mobius, Mark, “Getting Brazil to Clean Up Its Act￿, Latin Finance, 2000. 




Another form of protection is the Board of Directors, which is theoretically in 
charge of overseeing and auditing management. However, minority shareholders 
frequently find it hard to participate in this body. This exclusion of minority shareholder 
representation need not be illegal in nature. Since board positions are frequently voted 
on a seat by seat basis, the shareholder with the majority position can sequentially 
defeat minority owners. Thus, board composition is still determined by the controlling 
shareholder. In addition, the Board need not take concrete action against minority 
interests, since board inaction itself can have large expropriation implications. An 
example of this occurs when a firm goes private. A board controlled by a majority 
shareholder may effectively do nothing to prevent the sale of the firm at below-market 
prices to a party related to the controlling owner. In fact, corporate boards of directors 
have been found to be, on average, management controlled and passive (Cannon, 2003).  
In developing countries, these same conditions translate to boards being controlled by 
the founding family or the controlling shareholder. 
 
Finally, the presence of large institutional shareholders may incorporate more 
demanding participants with higher corporate governance standards and, possibly, the 
voting power to enforce them. Though the presence of institutional shareholders has 
been documented to affect stock price behavior (Hotchkiss and Strickland, 2003), it is 
not as clear whether this presence affects a firm￿s corporate governance.  If they have a 
sufficiently high stake in the firm, these shareholders will be active participants and, 
hopefully, potential allies for minority groups seeking more attention. However, as 
stated by Sheleifer and Vishny (1997), ￿The effectiveness of large shareholders￿is 
intimately tied to their ability to defend their rights￿. The implication is that even large 
foreign shareholders may be exposed to expropriation if they hold minority equity 
positions. In many developing countries, the reality is that even large institutional 
shareholders find it hard to protect their own rights, let alone lead an effort to protect 
that of others.   
 
In addition to the failure of traditional protective mechanisms in emerging 
economies, these markets have also been characterized by weak legal frameworks.   
Though there seems to be a general agreement that governance efforts should be 
directed towards transparency and the protection of minority rights, it has been very 
difficult to translate these desired improvements into explicit standards that firms need 
to comply by law. In part, this is explained by the fact that any reform faces political 
opposition from controlling shareholders keen on prolonging their expropriation 
possibilities (Shleifer and Wolfenzon 2002). The result is slow legal reform. Thus, 
regulators and corporations have had to seek alternative ways of signaling commitment 
to higher governance standards without necessarily having to wait for local regulation to 
￿catch-up￿ to global standards. A much publicized result of this effort is the adoption of 
voluntary codes of conduct by corporations. These codes list a series of governance 
requirements which firms voluntarily try to satisfy and which are stricter than those 
currently mandated by local regulation. With an agreed-upon periodicity (generally, on 
an annual basis), each firm reports the degree of compliance with the code. Though this 
is an important step forward, voluntary codes in emerging economies have several 
important challenges to resolve. The first is that adherence need not imply full 
compliance, so voluntary codes may simply provide a statement of intention. In this 
context, annual updates of how compliance evolves are critical. However, the second 
challenge lies with access to this information. Compliance reports are not always IE Working Paper                                    WP06-08                                14-02-006 
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available and, when accessible, are usually not found in a centralized location. The 
result is that investors interested in knowing how much progress has been made by 
particular firms in complying with their own corporate codes may have to eventually 
look it up in each firm￿s corporate web pages. Even then, one frequently finds that 
compliance reports are not updated or incomplete.  
 
 An interesting alternative approach to voluntary codes is the creation of special 
listing segments accessible only to firms that fully comply with progressively more 
demanding governance requirements. In this manner, the differentiation signal is clear 
(a firm either lists or does not list in a special segment) and validated by a publicly 
observable institution (the stock exchange). Compliance is much more visible because 
the contrary would imply delisting. Examples of this are the Prime Standard segment in 
Germany and the Special Corporate Governance Levels 1 and 2 and Novo Mercado in 
Brazil. Originally intended for small and medium size firms in high-growth industries, 
the German Neue Market was launched in March 1997 and had strict listing and 
disclosure requirements that went beyond the regulation in place. Eventually, the Neue 
Market gave way to Prime Standard segment that today boasts even stricter rules. With 
a similar philosophy, the Brazilian Corporate Governance Levels 1 and 2 and the Novo 
Mercado were launched as new listing segments in December 2000. In both the German 
and Brazilian cases, the intention is to reduce investor concerns for lack of transparency 
and protection by incorporating the exchange as an agent that certifies a firm￿s 
compliance of higher corporate governance standards. This ￿certification￿ is based on 
the firm￿s periodic reporting of financial information and the steps it takes to enhance 
minority rights.     
 
From a researcher￿s point of view, differentiated trading segments offer several 
positive features. First, it provides a clearly identifiable event indicating a firm￿s 
decision to adopt higher governance standards. Second, the degree of compliance is 
clear and discrete, instead of containing partial compliance possibilities that may exist 
under voluntary codes or in memberships with ethics-related organizations (Chavez et. 
al. 2002). Third, because all firms are listed on the exchange, market prices are available 
for all firms. This allows the use of market-based measures of firm value instead of 
accounting ones.       
 
In this paper, we seek to empirically determine whether (1) the market assigns 
value to a firm￿s commitment to improved corporate governance and (2) there exists a 
liquidity impact. Our proxy for this commitment to improved governance is a firm￿s 
incorporation to the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange￿s Corporate Governance Levels 1 and 2, 
which have a set of transparency and investor protection requirements that exceed 
current securities regulations, and which firms adopt voluntarily
6. For each firm, we 
observe the market price reaction that occurs when a firm announces its entry into the 
differentiated segments. We separate our analysis using two informational events: the 
first public release of a firm￿s intention to join the differentiated listing segments, and 
the actual incorporation date. We find evidence of a positive market reaction to news of 
a firm￿s decision to be listed in the differentiated segments. We also find that market 
reaction is a function of the voting rights provided by different share classes. Stocks 
with voting rights (ordinary or ON shares) present a stronger price reaction than stocks 
without voting rights (preferred or PN shares).  
                                                 
6 The compliance of entry requirements is guaranteed by the stock exchange, which provides an auditing 




Finally, we provide evidence on the liquidity implications of adopting enhanced 
corporate governance standards. A quarterly total trading cost measure (LOT measure) 
proposed by Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) is estimated and contrasted before 
and after a firm￿s incorporation into the differentiated listing segments. Because it is 
based on the occurrence of zero returns, this liquidity cost measure only requires daily 
stock prices. In addition, the LOT measure incorporates explicit, implicit and 
opportunity costs of trading. The availability of the type of data required and the 
comprehensive estimation it provides makes this measure of liquidity an especially 
useful one for analyzing emerging markets. Our results show that a firm￿s incorporation 
into the differentiated governance segments has a liquidity-enhancing effect in the form 
of lower trading cost, and that this effect is greater for shares that have voting rights. 
This is consistent with the notion that investors will prefer to purchase financial assets 
issued by firms that provide a better protection of their interests.  
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a description of the 
evolution of governance efforts in Brazil and our hypotheses. In section 3, we present 
our data and methodology. Section 4 shows our results. Conclusions are found in 
section 5.     
 
2. Corporate Governance in Brazil and hypotheses 
 
Governance in Brazil 
  Brazil has long been perceived as an emerging economy with high growth 
potential but important challenges. Relative to the 2002 ranking, the Global 
Competitiveness Report for 2003-2004 showed a decline in Brazil￿s standing. Its 
position in the Growth rankings was 54 compared to the previous 45. In addition, there 
is a strong contrast between foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio investment 
flows. While Brazil is preceded only by the United States and China in terms 
attractiveness for Foreign Direct Investment (Child and Rodrigues, 2000), the opposite 
has been the case for the purchasing of stocks by foreign investors. This is consistent 
with the long-perceived view that the Brazilian capital market, as is the case for many 
developing economies, needs to address issues related to transparency, investor 
protection and regulatory enforcement.  
 
  Historically, the Brazilian capital market has been affected by the region￿s 
economic volatility. The currency devaluations that resulted from the Latin American 
debt crisis of the early 1980￿s generated an environment characterized by high inflation 
and interest rates that stifled corporate borrowing. Instead of seeking financing for new 
projects, firms used their resources to invest in high-yield financial instruments and to 
accumulate wealth through equity investments. With a controlling stake, equity 
investments promised high capital gains, usually at the expense of minority 
shareholders. As has been argued by previous work [Lemmon and Lins (2003), Johnson 
et al. (2000)], crises tend to exacerbate expropriation of minority owners￿ rights on 
emerging economies. All in all, this decade showed little improvement in Brazilian 
corporate governance (Rabelo and Coutinho, 2001). During the first half of the 1990￿s, 
the investment environment changed dramatically. Recessionary conditions in the G-7 
countries prompted low interest rates. This, together with the emergence of mutual 
funds and other institutional investors, enhanced the attractiveness of investing in the 
high return environment provided by emerging economies with high growth potential IE Working Paper                                    WP06-08                                14-02-006 
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and privatization programs. The inflow of capital generated an overvalued Brazilian 
Real, which caused the historically modest current account deficit to increase 
dramatically, and exports to fall. Industrial competitiveness made little headway. During 
this period, high interest rates prevailed, as did a corporate culture that emphasized 
ownership entrenchment as a protective measure against expropriation.     
   
  Brazilian firms have made intensive use of non-voting shares (preferred or PN), 
as opposed to voting shares (ordinary or ON). This type of ownership structure 
effectively allows control of the firm with a proportionally low ownership stake. Given 
that as little as one third of issued shares can be ON, control can be exercised while 
providing as little as 17% of total capital. However, even this limitation has been 
circumvented. Rabelo and Coutinho (2001) demonstrate how certain family groups 
controlled Brazilian firms with as little as 8.5% of total capital by using pyramid 
ownership structures. As a result, the ownership structure in Brazil has traditionally 
been based on the dominance of either the founding family or a large shareholder, with 
management control falling in the hands of either of these controllers. Even as the 
shareholder base is now expanding both in quantitative (number of shareholders) and 
qualitative (higher percentage of institutional shareholders) terms, the concentration of 
control in Brazil has not yet shown signs of a significant reduction. By the end of 2003, 
the average percentage of voting shares in the hands of the largest shareholder was 64%, 
while the same figure for 1998 was 58%. 
 
  In this last decade, traditional protective mechanisms such as boards of directors 
have done little to prevent expropriation of minority shareholder rights. A year 2000 
survey on the board composition of 438 publicly listed Brazilian firms concluded that 
boards are small and with over extended mandate durations
7. In addition, the dynamics 
between boards and management is such that only 23% of boards may be considered to 
be independent of management.   
       
The concentration of control in Brazil, together with a weak regulatory 
environment and ineffective boards, has allowed for repeated abuses of minority 
shareholders. These have ranged from not allowing office space for minority 
shareholders￿ meetings, to direct ￿asset stripping￿ by purchasing shares from minority 
owners at below-market values. Even ADR holders were not exempt from some form of 
manipulation.  Thus, one of the most important corporate governance issues to resolve 
in Brazil is the protection of minority shareholder rights
8. 
 
  Recognizing the abuse of minority shareholders, the weak regulation protecting 
their rights and property, and the overall lack of transparency and information 
disclosure, the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa) has created three special listing 
segments for firms that voluntarily adhere to corporate governance rules that go beyond 
the minimum requirements set by the current Brazilian legislation: Corporate 
Governance Levels 1, 2 and the Novo Mercado. Of the three listing segments, the Novo 
Mercado (New Market) demands stricter corporate governance practices (see tables 1 
and 2). As an example, one of the main innovations adopted by Novo Mercado firms is 
                                                 
7 LCV Consultoria em Governanca Corporativa e representacao de Acionistas, December 2000. 
8 According to international fund managers and regulators, the abuse of minority shareholders by 
controlling groups has contributed to the decline of equity Latin American markets over the last decade. 
See, among others, ￿Storming the Castle￿, LatinFinance (1999), ￿Brazil·s new rules￿, LatinFinance 
(2000), and ￿Bringing back Brazilian equity￿, a LatinFinance supplement. (2000). IE Working Paper                                    WP06-08                                14-02-006 
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that they no longer issue non-voting shares. This may partly explain why Brazilian firms 
with existing dual class shares have been reticent to adhere to Novo Mercado rules, with 
only three firms having been incorporated in this new market. Thus, to allow a 
progressive convergence towards stricter governance mechanisms, Bovespa created the 
Corporate Governance Levels 1 and 2. As table 2 shows, Level 1 basically ensures 
greater transparency in information disclosure than current regulation, while Level 2 
includes practically the same governance standards as those in the Novo Mercado, 
except for the fact that firms are still allowed to maintain the non-voting shares.  
 
The adoption of the new listing segments has been an important step for the 
Brazilian equity market. The two Special Corporate Governance Levels and the Novo 
Mercado provide concrete and standardized measures of commitment to higher 






This paper studies the market reaction that occurs when firms listed in the Sao 
Paulo Stock Exchange announce their intention to incorporate into a differentiated 
corporate governance listing segment Listing in the differentiated segments implies 
more transparency and quality of accounting information as well as greater protection of 
minority shareholder rights. When minority shareholders have their rights protected, 
they are willing to pay higher stock prices (La Porta, 2002).  Thus, we hypothesize that 
there should be an increase in the value of firms that announce their commitment to 
improved corporate governance. This implies that, 
  
Ho1: There will be a positive stock price reaction when a firm announces its 
intention to join the differentiated corporate governance levels 1 or 2. 
 
 
Previous work by Nenova (2001) finds that, when the firm is undergoing a 
change of control, controlling stockholders share some of the private benefits of control 
with minority shareholders with voting rights. While this may be the case for these 
special situations, we believe that holders of voting shares are, in general, at least as 
exposed to expropriation by controlling shareholders as holders of non-voting shares. 
After all, buyers of ordinary voting shares not only pay for cash flow rights, but also for 
control rights which they may ultimately not be allowed to fully exercise. Our view is 
that both voting and non-voting minority shareholders are negatively affected by abuse 
of control. Therefore, the benefit of improved transparency and better protection from 
expropriation should be tangible for both groups. Thus, our second hypothesis is, 
 
Ho2: The stock price reaction when a firm announces its intention to join the 
differentiated corporate governance levels 1 or 2 will be positive for voting and 
non-voting shares.  
 
 
Finally, the incorporation of firms into a new listing segment with higher 
corporate governance standards than the rest of the market but identical trading 
environment, allows us to analyze the liquidity effect of improved corporate governance IE Working Paper                                    WP06-08                                14-02-006 
 
  8
while holding the market microstructure constant. We hypothesize that improved 
transparency and investor protection should decrease the asymmetric information 
between insiders and outsiders of the firm and, therefore, reduce trading cost. Consistent 
with this analysis, the literature has already documented a negative relation between 
investor protection and liquidity costs (Brockman and Chung, 2004; Lesmond, 2004). 
Therefore, our last hypothesis is that, 
 
Ho3: Total trading costs will decline after a firm’s incorporation into the 
differentiated  corporate governance listing segments. 
 
 
   3. Data and methodology 
 
We identify all firms that have been incorporated into the Special Corporate 
Governance Levels 1 and 2 as of December 2003 using incorporation information from 
Bovespa and news reports. The initial sample is composed of 34 firms represented by 
62 stock issues. The historical time series of daily prices is obtained from Datastream 
and gathered for both ordinary and preferred shares. We also gather, as auxiliary 
variables, stock market capitalization computed as number of shares outstanding times 
end-of-quarter closing price, quarterly trading volume, end-of quarter-closing price and 
quarterly variance calculated using daily.   
 
Two relevant disclosure dates are identified. The first press disclosure of a firm￿s 
decision to adhere to the new listing segments is classified as the Press Date, while the 
actual date of incorporation is termed Incorporation Date. To identify each firm￿s Press 
Date, we gather all news articles occurring up to 12 months before the actual 
incorporation date from the global provider of news Factiva. To ensure that the price 
reaction we analyze in our event study is directly related to the adoption of improved 
governance, only firms that do not present other relevant corporate events 10 days 
before or 10 after the press date are included. This filter generates a loss of 7 firms
9. 
Table 3 shows our final sample of 27 firms and 49 issues, along with the identified 
disclosure dates.  
 
The second disclosure date is the firm￿s actual date of incorporation into the new 
listing segments. This information is gathered from the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange 
database, and Factiva. In case where relevant event dates are not identified using these 
sources, the information is obtained by directly contacting the investor relations 
department of firms.  
 
 
3.1  Event study methodology 
 
We determine the market￿s assessment of a firm￿s adoption of higher corporate 
governance standards by applying event study methodology (Brown & Warner, 1980). 
To estimate abnormal returns around the event dates, we start by estimating the 
following market model regression: 
 
                                                 
9 Brasil Telecom Part  (president￿s resignation), Cemig (ADR issue), Marcopolo (equity issue), Ripasa 
(earnings report), Suzano (earnings report), Unibanco (incorporation to B2B market), Vale R Doce 
(change in debt rating). IE Working Paper                                    WP06-08                                14-02-006 
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   it mt i i it R R ε β α + + =  , 
 
where Rit is the return of asset i on day t and Rmt is the return of the Brazilian IBX 
general stock index on day t. In estimating the market model coefficients alpha and beta, 
we have adjusted for a possible ex-post selection bias (Amihud et al., 1997, Brown et al. 
1995). This occurs because a firm￿s incorporation in the differentiated corporate 
governance segments may have been a natural consequence of previous efforts to 
progressively adopt higher governance standards. If true, the ex-ante estimation period 
parameters would be based on returns that already incorporate the benefits of being 
perceived as more transparent and protective of shareholder interests. We adjust for this 
possibility by using ex-post estimation period parameters. Our estimation period 
includes 160 observations starting on day t=+31 and ending on day t=+190. 
   
The Abnormal return (AR) estimate of stock i at time t in the event window is 
calculated as: 
 
  () mt i i it it R R AR β α + − =     
 
The abnormal returns for each stock i is aggregated over the period that starts in 
day T1 and ends in day T2, and averaged across all stocks to obtain the mean cumulative 



















where N is the number of stocks. 
    
Because our sample of Brazilian firms may suffer from thin trading, distorted 
variance estimates may bias our results towards a rejection of the null (Cowan and 
Sergeant, 1996). We therefore apply the standard cross sectional test proposed by 
Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991), which allows abnormal return variances to 
differ between the estimation and event periods, and thus adjusts for event-induced 
variance increases. The test statistic is calculated as










































where SARit is the standardized abnormal return for stock i. The SARit is aggregated for 










                                                 
10 Cowan, Arnold R. Eventus software, version 7. (Cowan Research LC, Ames, Iowa, 2001) 
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As is generally the case of progressive incorporation of firms into differentiated 
trading environments, several groups of firms present common Press and Incorporation 
dates. This generates a concern for biased variance estimates due to a possible cross 
sectional dependence of returns among firms that share event dates. In our sample, for 
instance, we observe a specific date in which 10 firms, representing a total of 16 stock 
issues, were incorporated simultaneously. We adjust for this by forming equally 
weighted portfolios of all firms that share the same event date. The resulting estimation 
treats the common-date observations as one. This classification generates 20 portfolios 
for the Press Date event and 22 portfolios for the Incorporation Date.  
 
Finally, we also include the Generalized Sign Test (Cowan, 1992) as a 
nonparametric analysis. This procedure tests whether there is a significant difference 
between the number of positive and negative abnormal returns during each event 
window. A nonparametric test is useful in analyses that contain samples with a small 
number of observations that most probably do not follow normality. In our case, this test 
is warranted since the construction of portfolios and the further decomposition of our 
initial sample into sub samples according to voting rights reduces the number of 
observations. In addition, the Generalized Sign Test has been found useful for stocks 
characterized by thin trading.  
 
 3.2  Analysis of market liquidity 
 
We use the Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) limited dependent variable 
threshold model to estimate trading costs for the stocks in our sample. This model of 
trading costs is based on the occurrence of zero returns. That is, investors will trade on 
information concerning the value of the stock only when the return generated by the 
trade exceeds the costs associated with trading. Otherwise, investors will not trade, and 
the observed return on that stock will be zero. Thus, trading costs are a threshold that 
must be exceeded before investors trade upon information.  
 
  The model assumes that the market model is the generation process for returns, 
subject to transaction costs. That is, the true return on a security, Ri*, the observed 
return, Ri  , and the market return, Rm, are related as   
 
Rit*  =  β i Rmt + eit ,                      (1) 
 
where      
 
Rit = R*it - α 1i                    if      Rit*  < α 1i   ,       α 1i<0  
    
  Rit = 0                    if         α 1i < Rit*  < α 2i 
   
  Rit = R*it - α 2i              if         Rit*   > α 2i   ,              α 2i>0 
 
The first equation of model (1) describes the return generation process for the 
true return of stock i. In a market with no trading costs, returns would immediately 
reflect contemporaneous market-wide and firm-specific information. However, in the 
presence of trading costs, observed returns reflect new information up to the value of 
trading costs and only when the value of the information signal exceeds the cost of 
trading. The constraints of the model describe the relationship between the true and the IE Working Paper                                    WP06-08                                14-02-006 
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observed return. In the first and last constraints, where the absolute value of the true 
return exceeds the trading cost threshold, observed returns are equal to the true returns 
up to the value of transaction costs. The parameter α 1i  measures the trading cost 
threshold that must be exceeded before investors act on negative information for stock 
i, while α 2i measures the trading cost threshold on positive information. Thus, α 1i and 
α 2i represent the proportional trading cost for selling and buying stock i, respectively. 
When the true return does not exceed the transaction cost threshold (i.e., α 1i < Rit*  < 
α 2i), the observed return on stock i is zero. This model for stock returns is thus a limited 
dependent variable model, censored in the middle, with two unknown parameters α 1i 
and α 2i. Total roundtrip trading cost for stock i, TCi, is computed as the sum of α 1i and 
α 2i. The model is estimated by maximum likelihood using 3 months of daily returns for 




4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Market reaction to news of incorporation into the special listing segments 
 
Table 4 presents the event study results. We show Mean Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns and their cross-sectional Z statistics (in parenthesis) as well as Generalized Sign 
Test results and the corresponding test statistic (in parenthesis). Panel A shows our 
findings when the event is the first press notification of the firm￿s intention to join the 
differentiated segments (Press Date), while panel B shows results when the event is 
defined as the actual incorporation date (Incorporation Date). Panel A shows that there 
is a positive and statistically significant price reaction around the Press Date. We 
observe significant price increases for the (-2,+2), (-3,+3) and (-4,+4) windows   
surrounding the press notification. Our nonparametric results also show positive and 
significant results for the (-2,+2) window. These results support hypothesis Ho1 of 
increased value for firms that announce their commitment to improve their governance 
standards by listing in special segments. Panel B indicates that the information content 
of the actual incorporation does not prompt a market reaction. From a market efficiency 
viewpoint, this result is consistent with the notion that the first informational disclosure 
date (i.e., the Press date) must be the one that reflects the market reaction generated by 
an event. News of incorporation is a logical consequence, and thus already discounted 
by the market, of information that has been previously disseminated in the Press Date. 
These results contrast with those of Carvalho (2003) in that he finds a positive price 
reaction upon incorporation. The difference is explained by two adjustments we use in 
our methodology. The first is an ex-post estimation period to adjust for ex-post selection 
bias. The second is the grouping of firms into portfolios that share the same event date 
so that we correct for any bias due to cross-sectional dependence. Our results without 




We interpret our results as evidence that the market perceives a firm￿s 
incorporation decision as relevant and value-enhancing. This result has important 
implications in that the stock exchange, through differentiated listing segments, seems 
to be providing a certificate of credibility that is publicly observable, and valued, by 
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investors. Thus, stock markets can play a key role in helping firms differentiate 
themselves through exchange-defined governance codes in countries where governance 
legislation is either weak or progressing at a slow rate.     
 
Having identified the press release as the relevant informational event, we 
further decompose our sample into voting (ON) and non-voting (PN) shares to 
determine whether market reaction to the press announcement is contingent on asset 
type. Results are presented in Panels C and D in table 4. Here, because of the small 
sample sizes, non-parametric test results are relevant. For voting (ON) shares, we 
observe positive and significant results for all event windows. This behavior is weaker 
for non-voting (PN) shares, although they nevertheless present a positive price reaction 
for the (-2,+2) and (-4,+4) windows. Thus, when a firm publicly announces its intention 
to comply with special corporate governance requirements, voting and non-voting 
minority shareholders are benefited. These results lead us to support hypothesis Ho2. 
These results as consistent with the notion that minority holders of voting (ON) shares, 
being the ones most affected by potential expropriation from controlling shareholders, 
perceive news of the incorporation decision as a signal of improved governance (more 
transparency and protection).  
 
 
4.2   Effect of incorporation on liquidity costs 
 
This section presents the liquidity implications of listing in the special 
governance segments. To contrast market liquidity before and after incorporation into 
the differentiated segments, we run the following regression model:   
 
it ε + + +
+ + + + + =
it 7 it 6 it 5
it 4 it 3 i 2 it 1 0 it
VAR α PRICE α VOL α                                                               
MCAP α INTERACT α TYPE α ENTRY α α TC
       (3) 
 
where TCit is roundtrip trading cost for firm i in quarter t, expressed as percentage of 
value traded. ENTRYit is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if firm i has already been 
incorporated into a special segment in quarter t, and 0 if the firm has not yet been 
incorporated. TYPEi is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the stock has 
voting rights, and 0 if it is a non-voting share. INTERACTit is the product of ENTRY 
and TYPE. In order to account for stock-specific characteristics that affect trading costs 
(Stoll, 2000), we incorporate stock market capitalization (MCAP), trading volume 
(VOL), price level (PRICE) and return volatility (VAR) in our model. To isolate the 
liquidity effect of incorporation from the change in trading costs that may occur over 
time, we estimate model (3) with a fixed effects regression that controls for this time 
effect.  
    Our results are presented in Table 6 for two different specifications of model 3. 
In model specification I, the coefficient estimate for ENTRY, which reflects the 
difference in trading cost before and after incorporation, is negative and statistically 
significant. Thus, trading costs across all security types have decreased by 2.2% of 
value traded after firms have been incorporated into the improved corporate governance 
levels. This result is consistent with our hypothesis Ho3, that a credible and verifiable 
signal of commitment to improved corporate governance reduces asymmetric 
information costs and increases liquidity. Since we control for time and trading volume, 
our results can neither be attributed to the effect of the passage of time on trading costs 
nor to the increased trading volume that improved governance may generate. The IE Working Paper                                    WP06-08                                14-02-006 
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estimated coefficient for TYPE, measures the difference in trading costs between voting 
and non-voting shares. Since the TYPE coefficient is positive and significant, voting 
shares present higher liquidity costs than non-voting shares. In fact, voting shares are 
4.42% of value traded more costly. This result is consistent with most of voting shares 
being concentrated in the hands of controlling shareholders, and thus, presenting a 
reduced free-float.  
 
In model specification II we include the interaction variable, INTERACT, to 
analyze whether the liquidity effect of incorporation is influenced by share type. In this 
specification, the ENTRY coefficient measures the difference in liquidity before and 
after incorporation for non-voting shares. The negative and significant value we find 
indicates that there is a liquidity improvement after incorporation. That is, non-voting 
shares present a reduction of trading costs of 1.53% of value traded. The INTERACT 
coefficient measures the differential liquidity impact of incorporation for voting and 
non-voting shares. The negative and significant value we find indicates that voting 
shares experienced a larger liquidity improvement after incorporation than non-voting 
shares. That is, voting shares present an additional reduction in liquidity costs of 1.92% 
of value traded. In summary, even though both asset types benefit from enhanced 
governance measures, the shares with voting rights in the hands of minority owners are 





  In this paper, we observe the reaction of market prices to informational events 
that indicate a firm￿s commitment to improved corporate governance. The signal of this 
commitment is the announcement of incorporation into the differentiated corporate 
governance listing segments of the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange. Higher transparency and 
investor protection should increase market value since minority investors will be willing 
to pay higher prices for firms that offer more protection against expropriation from 
controlling shareholders (La Porta et. al., 2002). Because of its historically weak 
investor protection environment (Rabelo and Coutinho, 2001), we find Brazil to be an 
especially interesting country in which to study the effect of enhanced governance on 
firm value.  
 
    We also investigate the relation between corporate governance and market 
liquidity. The creation of special listing segments provides a unique opportunity to 
analyze the effect of improved governance standards on market liquidity while keeping 
market microstructure conditions unchanged. Transparency and investor protection are 
important for potential providers of funds, since they decrease the asymmetric 
information that exists between insiders and outsiders of the firm. Lower asymmetry of 
information implies lower trading costs. To test our hypothesis, we estimate a 
comprehensive trading cost measure (Lesmond et al., 1998) and analyze how quarterly 
trading costs are affected by a firm￿s decision to adopt enhanced governance. 
 
Our event study results indicate that the stock market greeted the news of a 
firm￿s commitment to improved corporate governance as a value-enhancing decision. 
The price reactions we observe when incorporation intentions become public knowledge 
are positive, significant, and directly related to the intended adoption of more rigorous 
corporate governance standards. When we further disaggregate our sample according to IE Working Paper                                    WP06-08                                14-02-006 
 
  14
voting rights, voting shares in the hands of minority shareholders
12 present a stronger 
price reaction than non-voting shares. We conclude that those that are at higher risk of 
having their rights expropriated (i.e., minority holders of voting shares) assign greater 
value to a credible signal of higher governance standards. In any case, since both types 
of securities experience a positive price reaction to news of incorporation, our work 
provides market-based evidence that improved governance increases firm value. This 
market validation is an important signal for many developing economies with high 
growth prospects but still immersed in resolving their weak investor protection 
environment.  
 
This paper also shows that a trading environment characterized by enhanced 
corporate governance improves market liquidity. Our conclusion is based on the 
observation that total trading costs decrease after incorporation into the new governance 
segments. This result holds for voting and non-voting shares. We also find that, though 
voting shares are 4.98% of value traded more costly than non-voting shares prior to 
incorporation, this difference is reduced by 1.92% of value after the stocks are listed in 
the new governance segments. Thus, shares with voting rights seem to benefit relatively 
more from higher transparency and better investor protection.  
 
In summary, publicly verifiable signals of commitment to greater transparency 
and investor protection, such as incorporation to special listing segments, seem to 
provide information that is positively valued by market participants. Firms that are 
incorporated into differentiated corporate governance segments experience a value 
increase that is also accompanied by a liquidity enhancement. Both benefits are stronger 
in shares that contain voting rights. These results are important for regulators, stock 
exchanges and investors, since they imply that market-driven measures can compensate 
for a weak legal framework. Requirements that must be met and maintained in order to 
join, and continue to list, in special listing segments may be a viable way, supplied by 
exchanges, for countries to comply with global corporate governance standards. Thus, 
stock exchanges can lead, not follow, the implementation of improved governance 
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Table 1: Comparing Current Brazilian Legislation and Novo Mercado 
 




Issuance of Non-voting 
shares 
Permitted Not  permitted 
Minimum free-float 
requirement 
No  25% of capital 
Tag-along rights for 
minority shareholders 
No   Yes 
Board of Directors 
 
One to three year 
mandate  
One year mandate  
International accounting 
standards 
Not required to adhere 
to international 
accounting standards 
Annual Balance sheet in 







Audited statements for 
controlling firm, 
subsidiary information 






Permitted  De-listing from Novo 
Mercado done through tender 
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Table 2: Requirements for Corporate Governance Levels 1, 2 and Novo Mercado 
 
Requirements for Corporate Governance Level 1 
 
•   Minimum free float of 25% of capital 
•   Public offering for the placing of shares maximize ￿capital dispersion to a broader 
spectrum of shareholders￿ 
•   Improved disclosure of quarterly information, consolidated statements and audits 
•   Disclosure of insider and controlling shareholders￿ trading 
•   Disclosure of shareholder agreements and stock option programs 
•   Facilitate annual calendar of corporate events 
 
Additional Requirements for Corporate Governance Level 2  
 
•   One year mandate for Board of Directors 
•   Annual Balance sheet in accordance with US GAAP or IAS  
•   Tag-along rights for minority shareholders 
•   Voting rights to preferred shareholders in the event of a merger or acquisition, spin-
off, or the signing of contracts with firms belonging to the same group 
•   De-listing from Level 2 through tender offer using the economic value criteria 
•   Adherence to the Market Arbitration Panel for conflict resolution  
 
Additional Requirement for Novo Mercado 
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Table 3: Descriptive information 
This table presents descriptive information for our sample. We list each stock issue, the industry 
to which the issuing firm belongs, the date of entry into the special governance listing segment 
and the corporate governance level that the firm joined. Finally, we also include each issue￿s 
market capitalization (in millions of USD) at end of 2003 (the date by which all firms in our 
sample had already been incorporated into the special segments.  
 
Firm  Industry  Entry date  Level  Market Cap. 
Alpargatas on  Apparel and Footwear  20030715  1  63.24 
Alpargatas pn  Apparel and Footwear  20030715  1  71.03 
Aracruz on  Pulp and paper  20020416  1  1147.12 
Aracruz pna  Pulp and paper  20020416  1  112.33 
Aracruz pnb  Pulp and paper  20020416  1  197.16 
Bradesco on  Banking  20010626  1  3707.98 
Bradesco pn  Banking  20010626  1  4127.49 
Bradespar on  Financial Holding  20010626  1  267.19 
Bradespar pn  Financial Holding  20010626  1  322.01 
Brasil Telec on  Telecom  20020509  1  1373.73 
Brasil Telec pn  Telecom  20020509  1  1550.26 
Brasil T par on  Telecom  20020509  1  844.06 
Brasil T par pn  Telecom  20020509  1  1660.42 
Braskem on  Petrochemicals  20030213  1  415.31 
Braskem pna  Petrochemicals  20030213  1  996.91 
Braskem pnb  Petrochemicals  20030213  1  3 
Cedro on  Textile  20031002  1  18.38 
Cedro pn  Textile  20031002  1  11.08 
Celesc on  Electric utility  20020626  2  85.73 
Celesc pna  Electric utility  20020626  2  5.42 
Celesc pnb  Electric utility  20020626  2  121.38 
Cemig on  Electric utility  20011017  1  907.32 
Cemig pn  Electric utility  20011017  1  1661.49 
Cia Hering on  Apparel  20021213  1  31.65 
Cia Hering pn  Apparel  20021213  1  13.01 
Confab on  Iron and steel products  20031219  1  33.96 
Confab pn  Iron and steel products  20031219  1  122.41 
Gerdau on  Steel  20010626  1  924.06 
Gerdau pn  Steel  20010626  1  2039.35 
Gerdau Met on  Steel  20030625  1  286.99 
Gerdau Met pn  Steel  20030625  1  638.07 
Itaubanco on  Banking  20010626  1  5345.52 
Itaubanco pn  Banking  20010626  1  5436.73 
Itausa on  Banking  20010626  1  1450.41 
Itausa pn  Banking  20010626  1  2402.72 
Klabin on  Pulp and paper  20021210  1  384.63 
Klabin pn  Pulp and paper  20021210  1  780.74 
Marcopolo on  Transp. equipment  20020903  2  65.52 
Marcopolo pn  Transp. equipment  20020903  2  115.4 
Mangels on  Iron and steel products  20030321  1  2.69 
Mangels pn  Iron and steel products  20030321  1  9.83 
Net on  Cable TV  20020627  2  1424.02 
Net pn  Cable TV  20020627  2  376.96 
Perdigao on  Food products  20010626  1  85.82 
Perdigao pn  Food products  20010626  1  248.71 
Randon Part on  Transp. equipment  20010626  1  47.1 
Randon Part pn  Transp. equipment  20010626  1  96.95 
Ripasa pn  Pulp and paper  20011112  1  221.92 
Rossi Resid on  Construction  20030205  1  58.73 IE Working Paper                                    WP06-08                                14-02-006 
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Sadia on  Food products  20010626  1  357.69 
Sadia pn  Food products  20010626  1  585.05 
Trans Paulista pn  Electric utility  20020918  1  414.48 
Unibanco on  Banking  20010626  1  1916.52 
Unibanco pn  Banking  20010626  1  1370.41 
Unibanco unit  Banking  20010626  1  0.05 
Vale R Doce on  Mining  20031212  1  14621.15 
Vale R Doce pna  Mining  20031212  1  7038.77 
VCP pn  Pulp and paper  20011114  1  1083.21 
Vigor pn  Food products  20011004  1  7.12 
Weg on  Machine & Equip.  20010626  1  490.88 
Weg pn  Machine & Equip.  20010626  1  546.51 
CCR Rodovias on  Transportation  20020201  3  755.11 
SABESP on  Utility  20020424  3  1603.78 
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Table 4: Market Reaction to Improved Corporate Governance  
This table presents event study results for different event scenarios. All panels present Mean CARs with their respective cross-sectionional Z 
statistics (in parenthesis), as well as the Generalized Sign Test indicating the number of positive and negative CARs, and the corresponding test 
statistic (in parenthesis). All results are generated a 160 day ex-post estimation period starting at day +30 (30 days after the event). Firms with 
common event dates have been grouped into portfolios. Panel A tests the null of zero abnormal return when news of a firm￿s decision to list is 
published in the press. Panel B tests the null of zero abnormal return when firms are incorporated into the special listing segments. Under the 
press release scenario, Panels C and D disaggregate the data according to type of issue and test the null of a zero abnormal return for Ordinary 
shares in panel C and preferred shares in panel D. Only firms that have both ON and PN shares are included. ***, **, * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5:  Impact of Corporate Governance of Stock Market Liquidity 
Using total trading cost (TC) as the dependent variable, we study the liquidity impact of incorporation into 
special corporate governance segments. Estimates, adjusted for differences in stock characteristics (economic 
variables), are obtained from the following regression: 
it ε + +
+ + + + + + =
it 7 it 6
it 5 it 4 it 3 i 2 it 1 0 it
VAR α       PRICE α                                                                                                  
VOL α MCAP α INTERACT α TYPE α ENTRY α α TC
 
Roundtrip mean trading cost estimates are expressed as a percentage of value traded and are estimated using 
the Lesmond et al. (1999) methodology. ENTRY is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the 
correspond quarter of the year occurs after the firm￿s incorporation, and zero (0) if it occurs before 
incorporation. TYPE is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if asset is an ordinary (ON) stock and 0 if it is a 
preferred (PN) stock. INTERACT is obtained as the product of ENTRY and TYPE. MCAP is market value, in 
millions of dollars, VOL, measured in millions of dollars, is quarterly trading volume; PRICE is end-of-quarter 
closing price; VAR is quarterly variance for local daily returns. N is the number of stock-quarters. Standard 
errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity (p-values are in parentheses). ***, **, * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 


















































Time effect (p-value)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
N 1228  1228 
Adj R
2  19% 19% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 